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Abstract:  The ability of individuals and groups to forecast a future event, with 
incomplete information, by using the trading history of an asset market is analyzed in the 
laboratory.  The results show: (1) when forecasters observe the summary of market-
transacted prices, they do not perform as well as when they are provided with a complete 
real-time sequence of bids, asks and contract prices; (2) groups do not outperform 
individuals in forecasting, and when the market does not have price manipulation 
incentives, individual prediction is better than the group prediction; (3)  in markets with 
manipulators, where only a summary of contract prices is provided, both groups and 
individuals are unable to predict better than flipping a coin.  This inability to aggregate 
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1.0   Introduction 
According to the efficient market hypothesis, market prices are an accurate 
indicator of the true value of traded assets since all publicly available past and current 
information is absorbed by the prices through the market mechanism.   Fama's 1970 
article provides strong empirical support for the efficient market hypothesis.
1  
Information markets have captured the interest of a large number of scholars who have 
tested its characteristics through experimental, theoretical, and empirical models.  Several 
theoretical studies have shown that market prices reflect the collective information of the 
system as the efficient market hypothesis claims.  However, there is a long list of reasons 
that might lead prices to imperfectly aggregate information, such as costly information 
(Grossman and Stiglitz, 1980), dependence on traders' beliefs, budgets, and risk 
preferences (Manski, 2005).  
The claim that information aggregation is reflected in market prices has been 
tested in the laboratory as well as in the field, with mixed results. For example, Plott and 
Sunder (1988) find a convergence to rational expectation (RE) equilibrium in contingent 
claims or single-security markets with the same preferences across traders, but failure of 
convergence in the single-security markets when traders have diverse preferences.  Plott 
and Sunder (1982) also find full convergence to RE prices when insiders are fully 
informed and failure when insiders have uncertain information about the state of nature.  
Many features of the market can potentially play a role in hindering information 
aggregation. Such limitations are known as “information traps” (Noeth, Camerer, Plott, 
and Webber, 1999) or “information cascades” (Holt and Anderson, 1997; Plott and Hung, 
                                                 
1 The article claims that security markets are extremely efficient in reflecting the complete and accurate 
information about the fundamental asset value.  
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2001).  In addition, the presence of manipulators seems to have successfully influenced 
prices in the 1999 Berlin election market on the Iowa Electronic Markets (IEM) (Hansen, 
Schmidt, and Strobel, 2004).  However, Oprea et al. (2006), found that manipulation did 
not damage the information content of prices in a laboratory environment with 
manipulation incentives.  Manipulation seems to depend on the conditions in the 
environment (Chakraborty and Yilmaz, 2004).
2  
In addition to experiments in a laboratory setting, field experiments have been 
conducted.  Camerer (1998) showed that efforts to manipulate odds in paramutual betting 
at racetracks failed.  Results from the IEM have shown that these markets outperform 
polls (Forsythe, Nelson, Neumann, and Wright, 1992; Rhode, Koleman, and Strumpf, 
2003).   Plott and Chen (2002) have shown that internal prediction markets at Hewlett-
Packard have outperformed the company’s standard estimation to forecast its printer 
sales. 
These studies of information markets have tested the ability of prices to represent 
the collective information of the crowd.  This literature has expanded to include how 
decision-makers would interpret the information they observe from market prices to 
predict future events.  This question has been analyzed in the laboratory by Oprea et al. 
(2006) who found that forecasters use market information in their forecasts and these 
predictions are extremely accurate, even when some traders have incentives to 
manipulate the market price.  This paper examines the prediction quality of forecasters 
under a variety of different treatments.  In particular, we examine decision-making when 
only the history of contract prices is provided versus a treatment in which the complete 
                                                 
2 The article shows that given a long enough horizon, manipulators may trade against their information and 
undertake short-term losses.   4 
time sequence of bids, asks, and contracts is provided to forecasters.  This treatment is 
based on the observation that in typical field prediction markets, only price and volume 
history is routinely provided to individuals and not the full information of offers to buy 
and sell for each asset unit.   
In addition, we examine how forecast quality is impacted when predictions are 
made by either individuals or groups.  In practice, many decisions in government, 
business firms, and family are made by a group rather than an individual.  The 
experimental literature has found that individuals and groups behave differently in 
strategic games, where groups are considered more “rational” than individuals as their 
decision is more aligned with the game theoretic solution.  This hypothesis is shown in 
several strategic games such as the centipede game
3 (Bornstein et al., 2004), one-shot 
ultimatum game
4 (Bornstein and Yaniv, 1998), trust game
5 (Cox, 2002), one-shot gift-
exchange game
6 (Kocher and Sutter, 2002), beauty-contest games, where groups exhibit 
faster learning than individuals
7 (Kocher and Sutter, 2005). 
In contrast with these findings, in dictator games, groups have a higher level of 
sharing than individuals, which departs from the theoretical solution (Cason and Mui, 
1997).  In a strategic market game, such as common value auctions, groups are found less 
rational than individuals, and their performance deteriorates when there are more signals 
                                                 
3 The game theoretic solution, through backwards induction, is for player 1 to end the game at the first 
node. While both individuals and groups failed to end at node one, groups on average exit the games earlier 
than individuals.  
4 When the decision maker is a three-person group, player 1 sends a lower amount, and player 2 has lower 
rejection rate.  
5 While no significant difference is found in the sender’s behavior, the group responder’s behavior is closer 
to the game theoretic solution (send nothing back).  
6 Player 1 decides the ‘gift’ or the wage level, and player 2 decides the effort level. Groups choose smaller 
wage levels and lower effort levels, which is closer to the game theoretic solution.  
7 There is no difference on average between the choices of inexperienced decision maker types: group and 
individual. However, in repeated games, groups were faster learners of the dynamics of the game and 
outperformed individuals.    5 
available (Cox and Hayne, 2006).  Other findings have shown no significant difference 
between group and individual behavior (Prather and Middleton, 2001
8).  
The results of our experiments are clear.  Individuals make better forecasts than 
groups, and access to the real time sequence of bids, asks and contracts as opposed to just 
a history of contracts increases forecast accuracy. 
 
2.0  Experimental Design 
This section will provide the design of the two market information treatments. 
The difference in the two treatments is the amount of market information provided to the 
neutral forecasters in the market.  These forecasters are neutral because they do not 
posses any private information.  In one treatment, they observe market information 
through the real time sequence of bids, asks, and contracts; in the static treatments they 
observe only the contract prices.  In addition, with the limited market information 
treatment, we examine the forecasting accuracy of groups versus individuals.  In both 
treatments we add the possibility of price manipulation to determine its effect on 
prediction accuracies. 
 
2.1 Design of Baseline Market Information Treatment 
A prediction market was created with eight traders.  Traders were endowed with a 
fixed amount of cash and a fixed number of tickets.  Tickets had a life of one round, and 
at the end of the round they would generate a dividend of either 0 or 100 with a prior of 
equal occurrence.  Throughout the round, subjects did not know the actual dividend of the 
                                                 
8 The empirical results from this paper are unable to show a performance difference between group-
managed and individually managed funds from September 1981-1994.    6 
ticket, but they did receive a clue about its true value.  First, with equal probability, we 
randomly and privately selected one of the two values (states) n={0,100}. Conditional 
upon the state, each trading participant received a clue (Black or White
9) randomly 
selected (with replacement) from a distribution where two out of three times the clue 
would comply with the realized value of the ticket.  These conditional probabilities are 
provided in equations (1) and (2). 
 
    Pr(Clue = Black | v = 100) = Pr(Clue = White | v = 0) = 
3
2
    (1) 
 
    Pr(Clue = Black | v = 0) = Pr(Clue = White | v = 100) = 
3
1
    (2) 
 
In addition to the traders, five uniformed forecasters where able to view the 
market activity, which included all the transaction prices and offers to buy and sell 
submitted by the traders as they occurred.  These sets of experiments will be referred to 
as real time markets and constitute our baseline treatment.  The five forecasters had no 
private information, i.e. they were given no clues. At the end of each round, forecasters 
made a private prediction about the value of the ticket only observing the real-time 
market transactions and knowing the general clue structure described in (1) and (2).  
Forecasters were paid based on the accuracy of their prediction and traders were 
paid based on the value of the tickets they held and their remaining cash as shown in 
equations (3) and (4) respectively. 
                                                 
9 A Black clue has a 
3
2  chance of being associated with the state dividend of 100, and a White clue has a 
3
2  
chance of being associated with the state dividend of 0 (zero) as shown in (1) and (2).   7 
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Ci = Endowed Cash for Trader i (=200)  
Ni = Endowed Tickets for Trader i (=2)  
Ji = Number of Tickets Trader i buys in the Market 
Ki = Number of Tickets Trader i sells in the Market 
Bij = Price of Contract j Purchased by Trader i 
Sik = Price of Contract k Sold by Trader i 
  
The real time market provides the baseline treatments, and the static time market with 
individual and group forecasters provide the other treatments.  Each is explored in the 
presence and absence of manipulation incentives.  As shown in Table 1, the difference 
between the non-manipulation and manipulation markets is that in the latter, half of the 
traders are given an additional incentive to affect the forecaster predictions.  The 
additional financial incentive for manipulators, which was added to (4), is given by 
equation (5) where T (0,100) is the prediction target given to a manipulator and Fj is the 
prediction of forecaster j:   8 
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Thus, if the forecasters’ predictions match the manipulator’s target, the 
manipulator obtains an additional payoff of 200.  The closer the forecasters’ predictions 
are to the target, the more a manipulator obtains.  Hence, the manipulators have an 
incentive to affect market prices in order to lead the forecasters to provide a prediction 
closer to their target.  Table 1 provides the experimental treatments of the baseline 
experiments. 
Table 1: Market Types in Baseline Treatments 
Market Types  Real-Time Market (BASELINE) 
Non-manipulation  8 Traders 
5 Forecasters 
Manipulation  8 Traders →        4 Traders 
                            4 Manipulators 
5 Forecasters 
 
The only difference between non-manipulation and manipulation treatments is the switch 
of half of the trader roles to manipulators. Manipulators have an additional financial 
incentive to affect the forecasters' predictions as shown in equation (5). 
 
The real-time market experiment findings are as follows
10: (1) manipulators 
attempt to manipulate prices; (2) manipulators succeed in increasing average contract 
prices by 7 points over the non-manipulation treatment when the target is 100; (3) prices 
are correlated with the information in the system despite the efforts of manipulators; and 
(4) forecasters’ predictions are a better estimate of the true state than market prices.  The 
RE model provided a reasonably accurate summary of the market behavior, although 
prices did not fully converge to the theoretical Bayesian posterior probability.  Even 
                                                 
10 These results are taken from Oprea et al. (2006).   9 
though market prices were not closely correlated with the true state, forecasters made use 
of them to improve their prediction quality. 
 
2.2   Design of Static Market Treatments 
This paper will extend the previous experiments by limiting the information that 
forecasters have in observing the market. In the new experiments, denoted as static 
market information, forecasters observe only the history of the market prices as opposed 
to the real-time markets, where forecasters were provided with complete information of 
how these prices are reached, through offers to buy and sell in real time.  Specifically, for 
each session that was conducted in real-time trading, the contract price history was 
retrieved and displayed to the individual and group forecasters.  Figure 1 provides an 
example of a contract series shown to subjects.  In the static experiments, the two types of 
markets, with and without manipulation, are replicated with individual and with three-
member group forecasters.  The payoff function of forecasters is the same as in baseline 
treatments as shown in equation (3).








                                                 
11 When the three-member group prediction matched the realized state, each member of that group received 
a compensation of 250 as shown in equation (3).   10 
Figure 1: Screenshot Provided to Forecasters in the Static Market Treatment 
 
The black dots show the contracts, orange dots are the last asks, and the green dots are 
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Table 2: Matrix of Treatments 









Non-Manipulation  INR  INS  GNS 
Manipulation  IMR  IMS  GMS 
The baseline treatment is represented by individual forecasters without manipulation who 
have access to real time market information (INR). An additional treatment in the baseline 
is when manipulators are added to the environment (IMR). Our treatments are represented 
by the cases where individual forecasters observe only the price history (static market 
information) from previous non-manipulated (INS) and manipulated markets (IMS). There 
are also treatments with group predictions where group forecasters have access to static 
market information from previous non-manipulated (GNS) and manipulated markets 
(GMS).  
 
In the real-time experiments, three sessions were run for each market.  Each 
session had 16 separate prediction market rounds.  Since the history of the market prices 
produced by these traders was used and shown to the forecasters in the static treatments, 
three sessions were run for each treatment in the static-time experiments with 16 separate 
prediction rounds.  In addition, three sessions each with the same 16 rounds were used for 
both individual and group predictions. 
The parameters of the information structure in our experiments are shown in 
Table 3.  Each manipulator was given the same target in each round; half of the time it 
was the same as the actual state, and the other half it was the opposite of the actual state.  
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Table 3: Parameter Table 
 






Target  Actual 
State 
1  6  100  2  0  100 
2  1  0  3  0  0 
3  2  0  2  0  0 
4  3  0  1  100  0 
5  5  100  1  0  100 
6  0  0  4  100  0 
7  3  0  1  0  0 
8  7  100  3  0  100 
9  3  0  1  100  100 
10  1  0  3  100  0 
11  4  -  0  0  100 
12  2  0  2  100  0 
13  6  100  2  100  100 
14  4  -  0  100  100 
15  5  100  1  100  100 
16  2  0  2  0  0 
Positive signals correspond to the number of black clues (n) that are assigned to the 8 
traders.  Signal strength is defined as s = |n – 4|.  The Bayesian decision is the binary 
(0,100) prediction a forecaster would make if he had all the clue information available to 
him. The target is the number given to manipulators that determine their bonus for 
moving forecaster decisions closer to the target. 
 
  The Bayesian decision calculated in equation (6) is defined as the choice a 
forecaster would make if he could see all the clues distributed for the particular round.  
We define a positive signal as a Black clue which has a 
3
2
 chance of being associated 
with the state dividend of 100.  The total number of traders in each session was eight; 
hence the maximum number of positive signals (n) in a round was 8.  We define signal 
strength (s) as s = |n-4|. Thus, signal strength varies from 0 to 4.  When n = 4, meaning 
there are 4 positive clues out of 8, the signal strength is 0, and the Bayesian expected 
dividend (V) of the ticket would be 50.   
   13 
             Bayesian Decision =  (6)                                              
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  Equation (7) provides the expected dividend value as a function of the number of 































=       (7) 
 
Graph A in Figure 2 charts the Bayesian expected value as a function of positive clues n 
while Graph B charts the posterior Bayesian probability of predicting the actual value as 
a function of signal strength s. For example when n = 8 (or s = 4), the posterior 
probability of the Bayesian decision being correct (predicting the value to be 100) is 
99.6%.  When n=0 (or s=4) the posterior probability of the Bayesian decision being 
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For each total number of positive clues in the market, the expected dividend value of a 
ticket is calculated using equation (7).   Given that the dividend values are either 0 or 
100, if the market were fully aggregating information, under risk neutral assumptions, 
market price prediction should follow this function. 
Figure 2 (Graph B): Probability of Predicting the True Dividend Value Using 













































































Each level of signal strength (|n-4|), is charted against the probability that the Bayesian 
decision listed in equation (6) will accurately predict dividend value of a ticket.     15 
The Bayesian probability of an accurate prediction will be our theoretical 
benchmark to be compared with the prediction accuracy forecasters. The accuracy of 
forecasters’ predictions in a round is calculated in (8): 
 
(8)                   
   Prediction    -        Decision     Bayes











- =  
 
Where: 
Bayes Decisionjt =   What a Bayesian would predict for the state if he had all the clues 
of session j in round t 
 
Predictionijt =  The actual dividend prediction of forecaster i of session j in round t 
 
Using the design of the prediction markets, we can compare the average correct 
prediction, as calculated in equation (8), for individual and group forecasters to the 
Bayesian probabilities of an accurate prediction as displayed in Graph B in Figure 2.  If 
the accuracy of forecasters on average is positively related to the signal strength, then we 
can deduce that the forecasters are effectively using the market to predict.  In addition, 
the prediction of the individual forecasters with real-time market information will be 
compared to the prediction of individual and group forecasters with static market 
information in order to observe any changes in the prediction quality. 
 
3. 0  Experimental Questions and Procedures 
In Oprea et al., 2006, it was found that manipulators affected the contract prices 
by increasing the average contract by 7 when the target was 100, and not affecting prices 
when the target was 0.  However, the effect of manipulators was stronger in the bids and   16 
asks compared to realized prices.  Bids were significantly higher when the target was 
100, and asks were significantly lower when the target was 0.   Thus, manipulators tried 
to influence price through bids and asks but this did not have an effect on forecaster 
accuracy.  Limiting information to only contract prices would not convey to forecasters 
this attempt to manipulate through bids and asks.  The question we wish to address is 
whether this lost information will have an impact on prediction quality. 
The importance of bids and asks in providing information to participants has been 
previously discussed by Plott and Sunder (1988), who offer it as one explanation for the 
better performance of contingent markets relative to single-security markets.  If the claim 
that bids and asks constitute important information to the uninformed forecaster is 
correct, then we should find diminishing accuracy of forecasters with static market 
information compared to the real-time market information treatment.  In particular, this 
paper focuses on three main questions: 
 
Question 1: Does the prediction quality of individual forecasters improve when they 
observe the real-time evolution of the market trades instead of the price history? 
Question 2: Are predictions more accurately provided by groups or individuals? 
Question 3: Is prediction accuracy affected by the presence of manipulators? 
 
The first question will be explored by comparing the data from real-time 
information treatment versus data from the static information treatment.  The second 
question will compare the difference between individual and group predictions.  The third 
question will compare predictions of individuals and groups in the non-manipulation 
treatment to those in the manipulation treatment.   17 
 
3.2   Experimental Procedures 
Subjects were recruited from the undergraduate pool of students at George Mason 
University.
12  All of the subjects had the role of forecasters and their earnings structure 
was the same as the previous experiments.
13  The procedures are the same as the ones 
followed in the first set of experiments.  The method of information distribution among 
the traders, who had generated the contract prices that were given to the forecasters, was 
explained in detail to the forecasters, paralleling the same process as in the real-time 
treatments. 
Each experiment consisted of written instructions that were read aloud, hands-on 
demonstration of how clues were generated, two unpaid practice rounds and sixteen paid 
rounds of decision making.
14  Each session lasted approximately 40 minutes. 
 
4.0    Experimental Results 
The purpose of this study is to analyze the prediction quality of unbiased 
forecasters when they only observe market price history.  The quality of their prediction 
will be analyzed along two dimensions.  First, we ask the question whether the 
forecasters’ prediction quality changes when moving from real to static market 
information. The second dimension comprises the actual Bayesian decision.  While the 
first dimension distinguishes prediction quality relative to the real-time markets, the 
second dimension distinguishes prediction quality relative to the prior, which is 50-50. 
                                                 
12 Subjects were recruited randomly from a database, excluding students who had participated in the first 
set of experiments in Fall 2005. 
13 At the end of the experiment, subjects were privately paid their earnings, and for a 40-45 minute 
experiment, they received $17.25 on average, in addition to a $5.00 show-up fee. 
14 Instructions and procedures can be found at http://ices2.gmu.edu/dorina   18 
 
4.1   Relative Prediction Quality of Forecasters 
We define prediction accuracy for round t of treatment k through equation (9) 
where i indexes the forecaster and j denotes the session: 
 
(9)     
   Prediction    -        Decision     Bayes
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Figure 3 charts the per-round prediction accuracy of correct forecasts for each treatment.  
This figure suggests that the best predictors are the forecasters who observe the real time 
evolution of the prices in a market without the presence of manipulators. Qualitatively, 
from Figure 3, individuals predict better than groups and predictions are more accurate 
with real time information.  However, in order to answer our questions quantitatively, we 
will take a closer look at the data by decomposing these aggregates to the particulars of 
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The treatment prediction accuracy is averaged across all rounds to obtain the percentage 
of correct predictions per round by the forecasters.  Qualitatively, real-time information 
improves forecast quality and groups do not outperform individuals in predicting the 
state.  
 
In order to determine whether there is any difference among the treatments, a two-
sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov (K-S) test for equality of distribution functions was 
conducted.  The K-S tests in table 4 show that the samples of all treatments come from 
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Table 4: Two-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov 
 
Treatments  INR  INS  GNS  IMR  IMS  GMS 
INR    0.047  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
INS      0.000  0.047  0.000  0.000 
GNS        0.000  0.000  0.000 
IMR          0.000  0.000 
IMS            0.047 
GMS             
The table lists the p-values from a two-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov (K-S) test for 
equality of distribution functions.  In these pairwise comparisons using the K-S test, the 
null hypothesis of equality of distributions is rejected for all treatments. 
 
 
4.2   Do Forecasters Aggregate Information in a Static Market? 
The odds ratio, as defined in equation (10) below, is the ratio of the probability P 
of correctly predicting the realized state and the probability (1- P) of incorrectly 
predicting the realized state.   Hence, when the odds-ratio is one, forecaster predictions 
are correct as many times as they are incorrect, and when the odds-ratio is greater than 
one, forecasters are correct more often than incorrect.  Specifically, P is the amount 
defined equation (8).  Thus, for each session and round we have an observation on P.   





The distribution of odds-ratios for each treatment is provided in Figure 4. If the 
distribution of odds-ratio is skewed to the right (below 1), then it can safely be concluded 
that forecasters are predicting no better than their prior of 50-50. This seems to be the 
case for the manipulation treatments with static information for both individual and group 
forecasters.  
In order to determine if forecasters are indeed aggregating information we need to 
examine prediction behavior as the signal strength changes.  The theoretical functional   21 
form between the probability of correctly predicting the state and signal strength is shown 
in equation (11), which is derived from equation (7).
15   
 








ln( , where s is signal strength      (11) 
 
From equation (11)
16, we can derive the values of the odds-ratio depending on the 
signal strength.  For instance, when s = 0, the natural log of odds-ratio is 0 and the odds-
ratio is 1.  As long as the odds-ratio is greater than one, forecasters are correctly 
predicting the state at a rate higher than the 50-50 prior.  If the odds-ratio increases as the 
signal strength increases, then it can be safely inferred that forecasters are aggregating 
this information in their predictions.  The further apart from the true functional form, the 










                                                 
15 Details of this derivation can be found in the Appendix. 
16 P(s) is defined as Prediction Accuracyjt (P) now as a function of signal strength s.   22 
Figure 4: Distribution of the Odds-Ratio by Treatment 
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The horizontal axis shows the odds-ratio, while the vertical axis shows the frequency of 
occurrence.  The six graphs in the figure show the frequency of occurrence of the odds-
ratio for each treatment.  In the treatment with group forecasters and static market 
information and manipulators, the odds-ratio of less than 1 occurs about 58% of the time. 
Odds-ratio   23 
Using the functional form in equation (11), the following random effects 
regression is estimated: 
 
j jt jt jt jt jt 1
jt
jt m g g i m s i s m s s    
Accuracy   Prediction
Accuracy   Prediction
m e b b b b b b + + * + + * * + * + * + =
-
6 5 4 3 2 )
1
ln(   (12) 
 
In regression (12) t denotes the round and j the session; sjt is the signal strength in 
round t of session j; m is a dummy variable for whether manipulators were present in the 
market; i is a dummy variable for our static information treatment; g is the dummy for the 
group forecaster treatment; * denotes interaction effects;  ejt is a random error term 
assumed to be normally distributed (N (0; 1)) and uj is the error term capturing the 
differences across sessions of the same treatment.  Table 5 shows how the dummy 
variables from regression (12) determine the aggregate coefficients for each treatment.  
For instance, in real time markets, individual forecast ln(odds-ratio) will increase by β2 in 
the presence of manipulators compared to their absence and by a total increase of β1+β2 
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Table 5: Dummy Variables and Coefficients Estimates 
 











i = 0 
g =  0 
m = 0 
 
i = 1 
g =  0 
m = 0 
 
i = 1 
g =  1 
m = 0 
 




i = 0 
g =  0 
m = 1 
 
 
i = 1 
g =  0 
m = 1 
 
 
i = 1 
g =  1 
m = 1 
 
Coefficients  β1+β2  β1+β2+β3+β4  β1+β2+β3+β4+β5+β6 
The dummy variables are:  static information dummy (i) is 1 when forecasters only 
observe the market price history and 0 for real time market treatments; group dummy (g) 
is 1 when the decision maker type is a group and 0 otherwise; manipulation dummy (m) 
is 1 for all treatments where manipulators are present in the market, and 0 otherwise.  The 
values of these dummy variables from regression in (12) will provide the coefficients for 
each of the six treatments.  
 
 
The regression estimates can be found in table 6.  All of the coefficients are 
statistically significant.  We will use the estimates from table 6 to construct our estimates 
of the treatment effects on the information aggregation properties of the market in the 
sections that follow.  
Table 6: Regression Estimates 
Treatments  Estimated 
Coefficients 
 






β1  0.526875  0.044834  11.75  0.000 
β2  -0.146097  0.053006  -2.76  0.006 
β3  -0.140854  0.053006  -2.66  0.008 
β4  -0.189212  0.074962  -2.52  0.012 
β5  -0.191404  0.054995  -3.48  0.001 
β6  0.150951  0.076382  1.98  0.048 
Regression estimates from (12) show that all coefficients are statistically different from 0. 
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4.2.1 Real versus Static Markets  
 
Result 1.a: Prediction quality of individual forecasters, who observe only the history of 
trading prices, is statistically lower than the forecasters with information on the full 
market evolution, both in the presence and absence of manipulators.  
We observe in Table 6 that in the non-manipulation markets, the coefficient for real-time 
market information treatment is 0.14 (β3) higher than in the static-time treatment.  This is 
statistically different from 0 at the 1% level.  This coefficient translates into an odds-ratio 
of 1.69 for signal strength s = 1 in real-time information treatment compared to 1.48 in 
static information treatment.  In the manipulation markets, the coefficient in real time is 
0.33 (β3+ β4) which is statistically higher than the static-information treatment. This 
coefficient translates into an odds-ratio of 1.46 for signal strength s =1 in real time 
compared to 1.05 for the static treatment.  Figures 5 and 6 provide a visual overview of 
these findings.  In both market types, with and without manipulation, forecasters with 
real-time information predict statistically better than forecasters with static information.  
The sample averages in static-information treatment fall out of the 95% confidence 
interval of the real-time information treatment.  We also supply market price data as a 
benchmark for the prediction quality of the forecasters.  In particular, we examine the 
average closing price for each treatment based on signal strength. Specifically, for each 
treatment (k) and particular level of signal strength (s), we calculate the adjusted average 
price in equation (14) where n is the number of positive clues, ms indexes the rounds in 
which the signal strength is s and Ms is the total number of rounds in which the signal 
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Result 1.b: In the absence of manipulators, individual prediction quality with real and 
static market information is statistically higher than the 50-50 prior and it increases with 
signal strength.  Thus, even though forecasts are more accurate with real-time market 
information, individuals aggregate information in both cases. 
The coefficients are statistically different from 0 for both real-time and static-
time, non-manipulated markets.  If the coefficient is greater than 0, the odds-ratio would 
be greater than one.  Hence individual forecasters correctly predict the state more often 
than the prior and the prediction accuracy is positively correlated with the signal strength.  
From Figure 5 we can also observe that in the non-manipulation markets, individual 
forecasters outperform the market prices with both real and static market information.  
The dotted line represents the average of closing prices in non-manipulated markets 
adjusted with the signal strength as calculated in (14).  The average adjusted price can be 
interpreted as the market posterior probability given signal strength. The market price 
line is always below the forecasters’ probability of predicting the state.   However, in 
Figure 6 we find that when manipulators are present in the market, both individual 
forecasts and market prices are uninformative if only static market information is 
provided.   27 



































1 2 3 4
Signal Strength
Real Time CI.95% Real




The grey area shows 95% confidence interval (CI.95%) of individual forecast with real 
time market information as a function of signal strength.  The dark line shows the 
individual mean forecast with static market information and the lower dotted line shows 
the adjusted price derived from the mean non-manipulation closing market prices.  
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The grey area shows 95% confidence interval (CI.95%) of individual forecast with real 
time market information as function of signal strength.  The dark line shows the 
individual mean forecast with static market information and the lower dotted line shows 
the adjusted price derived from the mean non-manipulation closing market prices. 
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4.2.2 Group versus Individual Prediction 
Result 2.a: Prediction quality of individual forecasters is statistically better than the 
group forecasters in the static market information treatment with no manipulators 
present. 
 
From the regression estimates in Table 6, we can calculate the estimated coefficients for 
each treatment from Table 5.   These estimates are reported in Table 7.   
Table 7: Estimated Coefficients from the Random Effects Regression 
Treatments  Estimated 
Coefficients 
 






INR  **0.5268751  0.044834  11.752  0.000 
IMR  **0.3807781  0.069425  5.485  0.000 
INS  **0.3860209  0.069425  5.560  0.000 
IMS  0.0507122  0.115104  0.441  0.660 
GNS  *0.1946171  0.088568  2.197  0.028 
GMS  0.0102597  0.858385  0.012  0.980 
These are the aggregate coefficients for each treatment using the estimated coefficients 
from regression shown in Table 6 and the aggregate coefficient calculations from Table 
5.  Coefficients noted (**) are significant at the 1% level, (*) are significant in 5% level. 
 
 
From the estimates in table 7, we find that prediction quality is not improved 
when groups forecast.  On the contrary, the individuals’ odds-ratio is higher than that of 
groups.  Table 6 shows a statistically significant coefficient of -0.19 (β5 in table 6) for the 
group dummy.  This corresponds to a difference in odds-ratio from 1.48 to 1.22 for a 
signal strength one, which translates to 60% correct predictions for individuals versus 
55% correct predictions for groups. The odds-ratio increases at an increasing rate as we 
move to higher signal strengths. Hence, we can conclude that group prediction quality is 
statistically lower than the individuals.  These results are highlighted in Figure 7 where   29 
the group prediction lies outside the 95% confidence interval of the predictions by 
individuals. 
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The grey area shows 95% confidence interval (CI.95%) of individual forecast with static 
market information as a function of signal strength.  The dark line shows the group mean 
forecast with static market information and the lower dotted line shows the adjusted-price 
derived from the mean non-manipulation closing market prices. 
 
Result 2.b: In the absence of manipulators, both individual and group prediction quality 
is statistically higher than the 50-50 prior and it increases with signal strength. 
Coefficients corresponding to no manipulation treatments from Table 7 are 
statistically significantly from zero.  This means that the predictions have a higher 
accuracy rate than the 50-50 prior prediction.  Using the estimates from Table 7 we 
generate Table 8 and Table 9 which show how the odds-ratio and thus prediction 
accuracies change as the signal strength changes for the non-manipulation individual and   30 
group prediction treatments.  Specifically, table 9 shows that individual prediction 
accuracy outperforms group prediction at an increasing rate as signal strength increases. 
 
Table 8:  Odds-Ratio in Non-manipulation Markets across Signal Strengths 
Type of Market  Real time & non-
manipulation  
Static time &  non-
manipulation  











Odds-Ratio (s=1)  1.70  1.48  1.22 
Odds-Ratio (s=2)  2.89  2.18  1.49 
Odds-Ratio (s=3)  4.90  3.22  1.82 
Odds-Ratio (s=4)  8.33  4.76  2.23 
The odds-ratios are displayed for different signal strengths, from 1 to 4.  The treatments 
observed are for all markets with no manipulators.  These odds-ratios are calculated by 
using the results from the regressions in Table 7. 
 
Table 9:  Forecasters’ Prediction Accuracy in Non-manipulation Markets 
across Signal Strengths 
Type of Market  Real time & non-
manipulation  
Static time & non-
manipulation  










P (s=1)  0.63  0.60  0.55 
P (s=2)  0.74  0.69  0.60 
P (s=3)  0.83  0.76  0.65 
P (s=4)  0.89  0.83  0.69 
The probability of correctly predicting the state is displayed for different signal strengths, 
from 1 to 4.  The treatments observed are for all markets with no manipulators.  These 
odds-ratios are calculated by using the results from the odds-ratios in Table 8. 
 
Result 2.c: In the presence of manipulators, individual and group prediction is 
statistically equivalent. 
In Figure 8, the dark dots show the prediction accuracy of individual forecasters 
when they observe the history of prices (static information) with manipulators.  The grey   31 
area shows the 95% confidence interval of individual forecasts.  The black line shows the 
group forecast accuracy with static information in the presence of manipulators as a 
function of signal strength, which falls within the 95% confidence interval of the 
individual forecast accuracy.  Both the individual and group predictions are not different 
than the 50-50 prior with no information.  The estimated coefficients from Table 7 are not 
statistically different from zero, which translates to a prediction accuracy of 50%.
17   
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The grey area shows 95% confidence interval (CI.95%) of individual forecast with static 
market information as function of signal strength when there are manipulators in the 
market.  The dark line shows the group mean forecast with static market information and 
the lower dotted line shows the adjusted-price derived from the mean manipulation 
closing market prices. 
 
 
                                                 
17 When the coefficient is 0, then ln(odds-ratio)=0 which means that the odds-ratio=1, and p(s)=1-
p(s)=50%.   32 
4.2.3 The Effect of Manipulation in the Static Market 
 
Result 3: With only static market information, prediction accuracy is reduced when there 
are manipulators in the market. 
In contrast to the results of Oprea et al. (2006), where the presence of 
manipulators did not effect prediction accuracy when forecasters had access to real time 
market information, our results show that with limited market information, manipulators 
can have a significant effect on forecast accuracy.  Specifically, the individual forecast 
estimated coefficient in the no-manipulation markets is 0.34 higher than that of 
manipulated markets. This difference is shown by coefficient β2+β4 in Table 6 which is 
statistically significant.  This holds true for both individual and group forecasters.  These 
results can be found in Figures 9 and 10.  The presence of manipulators has such a 
dramatic effect when forecasters have limited market information that the predictions are 
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No Manipulation vs. Manipulation
Static Time Individuals
 
The grey area shows 95% confidence interval (CI.95%) of individual forecast with static 
market information as function of signal strength when there are no manipulators in the 
market.  The dark line shows the individual mean forecast with static market information 
and the lower dotted line shows the adjusted price derived from the closing market prices. 






































No Manipulation vs. Manipulation
Static Time: Groups
 
The grey area shows 95% confidence interval (CI.95%) of group forecast with static 
market information as function of signal strength when there are no manipulators in the 
market.  The dark line shows the group mean forecast with static market information and 
the lower dotted line shows the adjusted price derived from the closing market prices. 
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2.5 Concluding Remarks 
Using markets in order to aggregate dispersed information about the likelihood of 
a future event is a powerful tool.  Uniformed observers can then use the information 
conveyed in market transactions by informed traders to improve their forecasts and 
decision making.    This paper examined the quality predictions by uninformed 
forecasters under a variety of conditions. Our results show that forecasters use the market 
information to improve their forecasts.  However, our findings show that when 
forecasters observe only a summary of transaction prices, they do not perform as well as 
when they are provided with real time access to the price discovery process.  In addition, 
we find that the presence of manipulators lowers the prediction quality of the forecasts 
when provided only with the history of the transacted prices.  In fact, the prediction 
quality drops to a level no different than the uninformative prior.  However, when 
forecasters are provided real time access to bids, asks and contracts, their predictions 
significantly improve even when manipulators are present in the market.   
The literature on comparing group and individual decision-making is growing at a 
rapid pace, and yet the findings are inconclusive.  We have added to this literature to 
examine the prediction quality of groups relative to individuals in our markets. We find 
that group prediction does not perform as well as individuals in accurately forecasting the 
state.   This suggests that in a non-strategic setting, individual decision-making is likely 
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Appendix A: Derivation of Functional Form 
 
We shall start the calculations from the Bayesian expected value of a ticket as a function 
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We have defined the signal strength (s) in relation to positive signals (n) as s = |n-
4|.  The expression inside the absolute value will change signs depending on the value of 
n, but the signal strength will always take a positive value between 0 and 4.  Hence, the 
probability of correctly predicting the state can be derived from the Bayesian prediction 



















0) (s   or   4 n   if                     
n) - 4 (s   or   4 n   if   
4) - n (s   or   4 n   if        









) ( ) | Pr(
) 4 ( 2



































































   37 
References: 
 
Allen, F., & Gale, D. (1992). Stock-Price manipulation. The Review of Financial Studies, 
5, 503--529. 
Anderson, L., & Holt , C. (1997). Information Cascades in the Laboratory. American 
Economic Review, 87(5), 847-62. 
Blander, A. (2000). Are Two Heads Better than One?: An Experimental Analysis of 
Group vs. Individual Decision Making. NBER Working Paper 7909. 
Bornstein, G., Kugler, T., & Ziegelmeyer, A. (2004) Individual and group decisions in 
the centipede game: Are groups more rational players?, Journal of Experimental 
Social Psychology, 40, 599-605. 
Bornstein G., & Yaniv, I. (1998). Individual and Group Behavior in the Ultimatum 
Game: Are Groups more “Rational” Players. Experimental Economics, 101-108. 
Camerer,C. (1998). Can asset markets be manipulated? A Field Experiment with Race-
track Betting. Journal of Political Economy, 106, 457-482. 
Cason, T. N., & Mui, V. (1997). A laboratory study of group polarization in the team 
dictator game. Economic Journal, 107, 1465–1483. 
Chakrabortya, A., & Ylmaz, B. (2004). Manipulation in market order models. Journal of 
Financial Markets, 7, 187-206. 
Cox, J. C. (2002). Trust, reciprocity, and other-regarding preferences: Groups vs. 
individuals and males vs. females. In R. Zwick & A. Rapoport (Eds.), Advances 
in Experimental Business Research. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers. 
Cox, J., & Hayne, S. (2006). Barking up the right tree: Are small groups rational agents? 
Experimental Economics, 9(3), 209-222.   38 
Fama, E. (1970). Efficient Capital Markets: A Review of Theory and Empirical Work. 
Journal of Finance, 25(2), 383-417. 
Forsythe, R., Nelson, F., Neumann, G., & Wright, J. (1992). Anatomy of an experimental 
political stock market. American Economic Review, 82, 1142-1161. 
Forsythe, R., & Lundholm, R. (1990). Information aggregation in an experimental 
market. Econometrica, 58, 309-347. 
Grossman, S.J. & Stiglitz, J.E. (1980). On the Impossibility of Informationally Efficient 
Markets. American Economic Review, 70(3), 393-408.  
Grossman, S.J. & Stiglitz, J.E. (1976). Information and Competitive Price Systems. 
American Economic Review, 66(2), 246-253. 
Gjerstad, S. (2005). Risk aversion, beliefs and prediction market equilibrium. Economic 
Science Laboratory, University of Arizona. 
Greene, W. (2002). Econometric Analysis, 5th ed. New York: Prentice Hall. 
Hansen, J., Schmidt, C., & Strobel, M. (2004). Manipulation in political stock markets – 
preconditions and evidence. Applied Economics Letters, 11, 459-463. 
Hanson, R., & Oprea, R. (2004). Manipulators increase information market accuracy, 
George Mason University Working Paper. 
Hanson, R., Oprea, R. & Porter, D. (2006). Information Aggregation and Manipulation in 
an Experimental Market. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 60, 
449-459. 
Hanson, R., Oprea, R., Porter, D., Hibbert, C. & Tila, D. (2006). Interpretation and 
Manipulation in Imperfect Prediction Market, George Mason University Working 
Paper.   39 
Kocher M.G., & Sutter M. (2005). The Decision Maker Matters: Individual versus Group 
Behavior in experimental Beauty-Contest Games. Economic Journal, 115, 200-
223. 
Kocher, M., & Sutter, M. (2003), Individual versus group behavior and the role of the 
decision making process in gift-exchange experiments. Royal Economic Society 
Annual Conference,125. 
Kumar, P., & Seppi, D. (1992). Futures manipulation with ’cash settlement’. Journal of 
Finance, 47, 1485-1502. 
Manski, C. (2004). Interpreting the Predictions of Prediction Markets. NBER Working 
Paper 10359. 
Muth, J. (1961). Rational Expectations and the Theory of Price Movements. 
Econometrica, 29, 315-335. 
Noeth, M., Camerer, C. F., Plott, C. & Webber, M.R. (1999). Information Aggregation in 
Experimental Asset Markets: Traps and Misaligned Beliefs. Social Science 
Working Paper No. 1060. Pasadena: California Institute of Technology. 
Plott, C., & Sunder,S. (1982). Efficiency of experimental security markets with insider 
information: an application of rational-expectations models. The Journal of 
Political Economy, 90, 663-698. 
Plott, C., & Sunder,S. (1988). Rational expectations and the aggregation of diverse 
information in laboratory security markets. Econometrica, 56, 1085-1118. 
Plott, C. & Hung, A. (2001). Information Cascades: Replication and an Extension to 
Majority Rule a Conformity-Rewarding Institutions. American Economic Review, 
91(5), 1508-1520.   40 
Prather, L.J., & Middleton, K.L. (2002). Are N + 1 heads better than one? The case of 
mutual fund managers. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 47(1), 
103–120. 
Strumpf, K., & Rhode, P. (2003). Historical presidential betting markets. Journal of 
Economic Perspectives, 18, 127-141. 
Tucker, J., & Meirowitz A. (2004). Learning from Terrorist Markets. Perspectives on 
Politics, 2, 331-336. 
Wolfers, J., & Zitzewitz, E. (2004). Prediction markets. Journal of Economic 
Perspectives, 18, 107-126. 
Wolfers, J., & Zitzewitz, E. (2005). Interpreting prediction market prices as probabilities. 







08-04 Caginalp, G., Hao, L., Porter, D. and Smith, V. Asset Market Reactions to News: An Experimental 
Study.  
08-03 Thomas, C. and Wilson, B. Horizontal Product Differentiation in Auctions and Multilateral 
Negotiations.  
08-02 Oprea, R., Wilson, B. and Zillante, A. War of Attrition: Evidence from a Laboratory Experiment on 
Market Exit.  
08-01 Oprea, R., Porter, D., Hibbert, C., Hanson, R. and Tila, D. Can Manipulators Mislead Prediction 
Market Observers? 